Kurzus nemzetközi vendég- és részidős hallgatóknak
- Kar
- Bölcsészettudományi Kar
- Szervezet
- BTK Filozófia Intézet
- Kód
- MA-ERA-IPH-S-1
- Cím
- Philosophy of Mind
- Tervezett félév
- Őszi
- Meghirdetve
- 2023/24/2
- ECTS
- 8
- Nyelv
- en
- Oktatás célja
- General aim of the course: The course provides an introduction to some of the main topics in contemporary philososophy of mind, i. e. different views on the mind-body relation, the nature of consciousness and intentionality. Content of the course I. The Mind-Body relation 1. Cartesian Dualism Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM. 2. Logical Behaviorism Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM. Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.* 3-4. Materialism 3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM. Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966). 17–25. 4. Eliminative Materialism Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM. Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981). 67–90. 5-6. Functionalism 5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM. Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM. 6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind Classical Cognitivism Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981(2), 215-226. Criticism of Classical Cognitivism Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM. 7. Anomalous Monism Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM. II. Consciousness 8. The Problem of Consciousness Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM. Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM. 9. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. The Journal of Philosophy 5 (1986). 291-295. Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I.)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154. McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM. 10. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments Kripke, S.: Naming and Neccesity (exerpts). In CPM. Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140. III. Intentionality 10. The Nature of Intentionality Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM. Chisholm, R. M. "Intentional Inexistence" (excerpts). In CPM.* 11-12. Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127. Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM. 13. Interpretationism: The Intentional Stance Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM. Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy. 88 (1991) 27-51.* 14. Intentionality and Phenomenology Horgan, T. – Tienson, J. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In CPM. Abbreviation CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Grading criteria, specific requirements: (1) Active participation in the course, 2) presentation, 3) course paper. Required reading: listed above, except the texts marked by *. Suggested further reading: the texts marked by * and Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997. Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) Mental Representation. Oxford, Backwell, 1994.