Course for international guest/part time students
- Faculty
- Faculty of Humanities
- Organization
- BTK Institute of Philosophy
- Code
- BMI-FILD-323.02
- Title
- Philosophy of mind
- Usual semester
- Spring
- Published semester
- 2025/26/2
- ECTS
- 4
- Language
- en
- Learning outcomes
- General aim of the course: The course introduces some of the main topics in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, i.e. different views on the mind-body relation, intentionality and consciousness. Course content: The course present key topics, positions and debates in analytic philosophy of mind from the mid-20th century onwards. We will discuss the major approaches to the mind-body problem, such as logical behaviorism, reductionist and eliminative materialism, functionalism and the computational theory of mind, interpretationism, and anomalous monism. We will also address the metaphysical debates on the nature of consciousness, materialist and dualist positions, and naturalistic accounts of intentionality. Grading criteria, specific requirements: (1) Active participation in the course, 2) presentation, 3) exam. Content of the course I. The Mind-Body relation 1. Cartesian Dualism Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM. 2. Logical Behaviorism Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM. Carnap, R. Psychology in Physical Language. In Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism. New York, Free Press, 1959. 165–198.* 3-4. Materialism 3. Reductionist Materialism: Mind-Brain Identity Theory Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM. Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. Lewis, D. An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966). 17–25. 5-6. Functionalism 5. The Functionalist Conception of the Mind Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM. Block, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In CPM. 6. The Computationalist Theory of Mind Classical Cognitivism Haugeland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981(2), 215-226. Criticism of Classical Cognitivism Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. In CPM. II. Intentionality 7. The Nature of Intentionality Brentano, F. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (excerpts). In CPM. Chisholm, R. M. Intentional Inexistence (excerpts). In CPM.* 8. Metapysical Approaches to Intentionality: Naturalistic Theories Intentional Realism Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127. Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM. 9. Eliminativism about Intentionality/Folk Psychology Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981). 67–90. 10-11. Alternatives to the Metapysical Approach 10. Intentional Stance: Dennett’s Interpretationism and Fictionalism Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM. Dennett, D.C. Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy. 88 (1991) 27-51.* 11. Anomalous Monism: Davidson’s Interpretationism Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM. III. Consciousness 12. The Problem of Consciousness Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM. Block, N. Concepts of Consciousness. In CPM. 13. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. The Journal of Philosophy 5 (1986). 291-295. Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. Van Gulick, R. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind. Are We All Just Armadillos (Part I.)? In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays.Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 137-154. McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM. 14. Dualism vs Materialism about Qualia: Modal Arguments Kripke, S. Naming and Neccesity (excerpts). In CPM. Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140. 15. Eliminativism about Qualia Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM. Abbreviation CPM = Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. All readings will be available on the course site (on Teams). Required reading: listed above, except the texts marked by *. Suggested further reading: the texts marked by * and Block, N. – Flanagan, O. J. – Güzeldere, G. (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1997. Chalmers, D. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. Rosenthal, D. M. (ed.) The Nature of Mind. New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. Stich, S. – Warfield, T. (eds.) Mental Representation. Oxford, Blackwell, 1994.
- Assessment method
- Exam questions Topics for the oral exam list A 1. A and B. Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM. 2. A and B. Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM. 3. A. Smart, J. J. C. Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review 68 (1959). 141–56. or in CPM. 4. A. Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. In CPM. 5. A. Putnam, H. The Nature of Mental States. In CPM. 6. A and B. Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57. 7. A and B. Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM. 8. A and B Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM. 9. A and B. Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. The Journal of Philosophy 5 (1986). 291-295. A. Levine, J. Leaving out What is it Like. In In Davies, M. – Humphreys, G. (eds.) Consciousness – Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford, Blackwell, 1993. 121-136. 10. A. Kripke, S.: Naming and Necessity (exerpts). In CPM. 11. A. Fodor, J. Meaning and the World Order. In Psychosemantics. Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987. 97-127. 12. A and B. A. Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM. Topics for the oral exam list B 1. A and B. Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI). In CPM. 2, A and B. Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Chap. 1. Descartes Myth. In CPM. 3. B. Armstrong, D. M. The Causal Theory of Mind. In CPM. 4. B. Churchland, P. M. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 5. B. Haugland, J. The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism.Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981(2), 215-226. 6. A and B. Searle, J. R. Minds, Brains and Computers. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57. (in the course e-mail drive) 7. A and B. Davidson, D. Mental Events. In CPM. 8. A and B Nagel, T. What is it Like to be a Bat? In CPM. 9. B. Jackson, F. What Mary Didn‘t Know. The Journal of Philosophy 5 (1986). 291-295. McGinn, C. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? In CPM. 10. B. Chalmers, D. Naturalistic Dualism. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 123-140. 11. B. Millikan, G. R. Biosemantics. In CPM. 12 A and B. A. Dennett, D.C. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In CPM. At the oral exam students are supposed to know the key concepts referred to in the papers, and to be able to reconstruct the main theses/points of the text concerned, and the main arguments offered in favor of them.