Course for international guest/part time students
- Faculty
- Faculty of Science
- Organization
- TTK Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology
- Code
- evojatsb22em
- Title
- Evolutionary game theory L
- Usual semester
- Autumn
- Published semester
- 2026/27/1
- ECTS
- 3
- Language
- en
- Learning outcomes
- Competencies: Knowledge: Knows the most important concepts of game theory and the underlying assumptions. Familiar with the simpler matrix games studied and the related conflict situations. Knows the dynamic description of a frequency-dependent selection replicator. Knows the basic assumptions of spatial games and related biological examples. Familiar with the problem of evolutionary stability of altruism and cooperation and the main explanatory principles. Ability: Able to perform static and dynamic analysis of simple matrix games. Able to draw biological conclusions from the model based on the analysis. Able to integrate game theory knowledge into evolutionary biology arguments. Attitude: Requires the integration of knowledge acquired in the field into his/her biological knowledge. Committed and open to scientifically based knowledge and an integrative approach. Committed to acquiring new competences and expanding his/her world view. Strives to develop a scientifically informed opinion on evolutionary biology. Autonomy and Responsibility: Able to think independently about basic selection situations, and to use them to build strategic game theory models. Able to conduct an independent literature search on a given topic, organise and present the information gathered. Have a sense of responsibility to acquire scientifically sound knowledge. Express professional opinions on evolutionary biology issues in a responsible manner
- Course content
- Basic concepts in game theory. Definition of ESS. The hawk-dove game as a basic model. The Bishop Cannings theorem and its application. Mixed and pure strategies. Games with and without multiple ESS. The coordination and the rock-paper-scissors game. Biological examples of the rock-paper-scissors game. The replicator dynamics in the analysis of the hawk-dove game. The relationship between the fixed points of the dynamics and ESS. Sex ratio in evolutionary equilibrium. The concept of local ESS. The concept of asymmetric ESS. Analysis of the asymmetric hawk-dove game. The web-protective behaviour of Agelenopsis aperta. Arms race situation in biology. Concept and classification of signal systems. The Zahavi principle. Experiments on Cyrtodyopsis dalmanni’s honest communication. Analysis of the Sir Philip Sydney game. Signal cost and honest communication. Basic assumptions of the adaptive dynamics approach. Continuous stability and branching point. Application of adaptive dynamics: species selection. Game-theoretic models of mutual altruism.
- Assessment method
- k5 = exam mark (5) (1 failed, 5 excellent) The assessment is based on an evaluation of students' knowledge on the basis of individual performance. The topics covered are grouped into items that represent the knowledge to be acquired. Students give an oral presentation of one item to demonstrate their knowledge. During the examination, it is important to have a precise knowledge of biological and mathematical assumptions and to draw the correct biological conclusions from the behaviour of the models.
- Bibliography
- Scheuring I.: Evolutionary game theory, electronic textbook (manuscript) Lecture handouts of selected topics